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Abstract— Existing network simulators perform reasonably well
in evaluating the performance of network protocols, but lack the
capability of verifying the correctness of network protocols. In this
paper, we present our ongoing research on extending J-Sim — an
open-source, component-based compositional network simulation
environment — with the model checking capability to explore
the state space created by a network protocol in order to find a
violation of a desirable safety property and/or to find a witness for
a desirable liveness property if any exists. This paper shows how
J-Sim can model-check the Ad-Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector
(AODV) routing protocol, a fairly complex network protocol with
thousands of lines of Java code. We also exploit protocol-specific
properties in the process of exploring the state space, to reduce the
size of the state space and to guide the (best-first) search towards
paths that can potentially locate violations/witnesses in less time.
The experimental results presented in this paper show that a
best-first search strategy can provide several orders of magnitude
reduction in both the time and space overheads needed to find
violations/witnesses.
Index Terms— Network Simulation, Protocol Verification,
Model Checking.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern data communication networks are extremely com-
plex and do not lend well to theoretical analysis. With com-
puter/network entities and techniques interacting and interfering
with one another, theoretical network analysis can be rigorously
made only after leaving out several (sometimes subtle) details
that cannot be easily captured in the analysis [1], [2], [3], [4].
As a result, it may be more feasible to carry out simulation
to study and evaluate the performance of network entities
and protocols, and interaction among them. Several existing
network simulators (e.g., ns-2 [5] and J-Sim [6]) provide an
environment in which a network protocol designer can build a
protocol prototype, evaluate its performance with respect to pre-
selected networking metrics (e.g., system throughput, packet
delivery ratio, and end-to-end delay) and re-design/refine the
protocol if needed.
One major deficiency of existing network simulators is, how-
ever, that they only evaluate the performance of network pro-
tocols in several scenarios, but can not exhaustively analyze all
possible scenarios for correctness. If all the corner cases do not
appear (and hence cannot be investigated) in the scenarios stud-
ied, subtle errors in the protocol specification/implementation
may not be easily located in the simulation, and may manifest
themselves after the protocol has been implemented and de-
ployed. This could lead to serious, and sometimes disastrous,
problems. For example, a routing protocol that suffers from
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routing loops may cause data packets to loop in the network and
not reach their destinations. Another example arises in the area
of network security, where “holes” for security attacks may only
be discovered after protocol implementation and deployment,
causing severe damage to computer systems.
In the current practice, to check whether or not a network
protocol contains any errors, a prototype that was specifically
written for verification purposes has to be built (e.g., in an in-
teractive theorem prover and/or a model checker). This process
is an onerous, time-consuming and error-prone task. An inter-
esting question is then whether or not we can employ a single,
integrated tool to provide both the performance evaluation and
verification of network protocols. With such a tool, only one
prototype will be built and used for the two purposes, thus
saving both the time and effort of network protocol designers.
Motivated thus, we have extended J-Sim [6] with capability
to explore the state space created by a network protocol in order
to find a violation of a desirable safety property and/or to find
a witness for a desirable liveness property if any exists.
J-Sim [6] is an open-source network simulation and emula-
tion environment developed entirely in Java. It is implemented
on top of a component based software architecture, called
the autonomous component architecture (ACA), that closely
mimics the digital-circuit design. The basic entities in the
ACA are components, which communicate with one another via
sending/receiving data at their ports. How components behave
(in terms of how a component handles and responds to data
that arrive at a port) is specified at system design time in
contracts, but their binding does not take place until the time
when the system is being “composed.” With the separation
of contract binding (at system design time) from component
binding (at system integration time), a component can be
individually implemented and tested independently. When data
arrives at a port of a component, the component processes the
data immediately in an independent execution context (e.g.,
thread in Java). The interference between different data handled
simultaneously by the same component is thus minimal, and is
only subject to synchronization and mutual exclusion (in order
to ensure the integrity of shared data). In some sense, the ACA
realizes the notion of software IC because of this message-
passing, independence execution model [6], [7]. By closing the
gap between hardware and software ICs, the ACA realizes the
objectives of composability, extensibility and loose coupling
between individual components [8]. All of these features enable
new components to be included into J-Sim in a plug-and-play
fashion. For these reasons, we chose J-Sim as the network
simulator (rather than any other network simulator; e.g., ns-
2 [9], NEST [10], REAL [11]) to be augmented with the protocol
verification capability.
2In this paper, we present the theory, implementation and
evaluation of using bounded model checking (BMC) [12],
[13] in order to enable the J-Sim model checker to model-
check a fairly complex network protocol with thousands of
lines of Java code; namely, the Ad-Hoc On-Demand Distance
Vector (AODV) routing protocol [14]. We implemented such
a model checker (written in Java so that it can be readily
integrated with J-Sim), and incorporated it into J-Sim in a
way that enables the model checker to take control of the
simulation of a network protocol in order to explore (almost)
the entire state space, rather than just exploring one single
execution path as J-Sim does. One important feature is that the
implementation of the model checker does not require the core
design and implementation of J-Sim to be altered. Furthermore,
the model checker has been instrumented to take advantage of
best-first search strategies that exploit properties inherent to the
network protocol being checked, in order to guide the search
towards paths that can potentially locate violations/witnesses in
less time. We compare the performance of the various search
strategies and show that the best-first search strategy can locate
counterexamples1 of a safety property in a more timely and
space-efficient manner.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we provide background information on formal reasoning and
introduce concepts and definitions that lay out the theoretical
basis of BMC. We give the implementation of BMC in J-Sim in
Section III. Following that, we present our performance results
in Section IV. Finally, we provide a taxonomy of related work
in Section V and conclude the paper in Section VI with a list
of future research work.
II. BOUNDED MODEL CHECKING
In general, there are two basic approaches towards formal
reasoning of software and hardware systems: theorem proving
and model checking. In theorem proving, a formal technique
(e.g., deductive methods and induction) is used to prove that the
implementation of a system under study meets its specification.
Model checking, on the other hand, checks a finite state
machine model of the system in order to verify whether a
(safety or liveness) property holds. Model checking [15], [16],
by state space exploration, starts from an initial state of the
system and recursively generates successor system states by
executing the transitions (e.g., events) of the system. This
process continues until either the entire state space is explored
or an error is discovered. (Hence, in systems of infinite state
space, model checking is used for locating errors, rather than
proving the absence of errors.)
As compared to theorem proving, model checking has several
important advantages. First, it can be built into existing tools
and automated. Second, model checking does not require a deep
understanding of complex mathematical concepts. Third, when
the desired property fails to hold, a model checker provides a
counterexample of the sequence of events that led to the error,
thus helping in understanding why the error occurred and how
it can be fixed.
1A counterexample is a sequence of states starting from the initial state
and ending with the state in which the safety property is violated. A formal
definition will be given later in the paper.
One of the major challenges of using model checking is the
well-known state space explosion problem, i.e., the state space
of the system can be so prohibitively large that a model checker
may run out of memory. Several approaches to handling the
state space explosion problem (e.g., partial order reduction,
abstraction, just to name a few) can be found in [15]. In
principle, bounded model checking (BMC) aims at solving the
state explosion problem by exploring the state space up to a
(configurable) maximum depth in order to disprove a safety
property and/or to prove a liveness property. In what follows,
we formally define concepts that lay out the theoretical basis
of BMC.
Definition: The set of system variables G= fv1;v2; :::;vkg
is a finite set of variables which describe states of a system
or appear in formulas specifying properties of a system. Each
system variable vi 2 G has a type, which may be either simple
(e.g., boolean, integer, etc.) or composite (e.g., array of integers,
class, array of classes, etc.). The type of a variable indicates
the domain over which the variable ranges.
Definition: A state s is a function that assigns to each
system variable v 2 G a value s(v) over its domain. We denote
by S the set of all states. It should be noted that although G is
finite, S may be infinite because the domains over which the
system variables range may be infinite.
Definition: An expression is constructed from the system
variables and constants (e.g., 1) to which functions (e.g., +) are
applied. An atomic formula consists of propositions (boolean
variables) and formulas constructed by applying predicates
(e.g., >) to expressions. A state formula (also called assertion)
is constructed by applying boolean connectives (e.g., _, ^)
and quantification to atomic formulas constructing first-order
formulas. For a state formula j and a state s, we say s  j if
j holds on state s; i.e., if j evaluates to true in s. Otherwise,
we say s 2 j .
Definition: A transition t is a function t : S 7! 2S that maps
each state s 2 S into a (possibly empty) set of states t(s)  S.
Each state in t(s) is called a t-successor of s. We say that the
transition t is enabled on the state s if t(s) 6= /0. Otherwise, we
say that t is disabled on s.
Definition: A system P is defined as a tuple
P = < G; I;T >
where G is a finite set of system variables; I is the initial
condition, which is a state formula characterizing all the initial
states, i.e., states at which the system can start; A state is
defined to be initial if it satisfies I; and T is a finite set of
transitions T = ft1; t2; :::; tmg.
Definition: An execution path p of a system P is a
function p : N 7! S that defines an infinite sequence of states
p (0); p (1); p (2); ::: that satisfies the following two requirements:
1) Initiation: p (0)  I; i.e., p (0) is initial.
2) Consecution: 8 j 2 N, 9t 2 T : p ( j+1) 2 t(p ( j)); i.e., the
state p ( j+1) is a t-successor of the state p ( j).
Next, we define both the syntax and semantics of a temporal
logic which allows specification of properties such as safety
properties (ensuring that a desired property invariantly holds
along an execution path) and liveness properties (ensuring
that a desired property holds at least once on an execution
3path). These properties are related to the infinite behavior of a
system. Although there are different temporal logics (see [15]),
we focus on linear temporal logic (LTL) [17] because of its
widespread use and well-developed proof methods.
Definition: LTL Syntax: LTL formulas are built using state
formulas, boolean connectives (: (negation) and _ (disjunc-
tion)) and temporal operators (e.g.,  (next), 2 (henceforth)
and 3 (eventually)2). The LTL formulas are recursively defined
as follows:
 If j is a state formula, then j is an LTL formula.
 If j and y are LTL formulas, then :j and j _ y are LTL
formulas.
 If j is an LTL formula, then j , 2j and 3j are LTL
formulas.
The other boolean connectives, such as ^ (conjunction), !
(implication) and$ (equivalence) can be defined in terms of :
and _. Specifically, j ^ y =:((:j )_(:y )), j ! y =(: j )_ y
and j $ y = ( j ! y )^ (y ! j ).
Definition: LTL Semantics: LTL formulas are interpreted
over an execution path. Given an execution path p and an LTL
formula j , we specify the recursive definition for the notion
of j holding at position j 2 N in p , denoted by (p ; j)  j as
follows:
 For a state formula j , ( p ; j)  j () p ( j)  j .
 ( p ; j)  : j () ( p ; j) 2 j ; i.e., not ( p ; j)  j .
 ( p ; j)  j _ y () ( p ; j)  j or (p ; j)  y .
 ( p ; j)  j () (p ; j+ 1)  j . Therefore, j holds at
position j if and only if j holds at the next position j+1.
 ( p ; j)  2j () 8k  j;(p ;k)  j . Therefore, 2j holds
at position j if and only if j holds at position j and all
following positions.
 ( p ; j) 3 j () 9k  j;(p ;k)  j . Therefore, 3j holds
at position j if and only if j holds at some position k j.
Next, we formally define BMC. In principle, the concept
of BMC is to consider only a finite prefix of an execution
path. We focus on safety properties (LTL formulas of type 2j )
and liveness properties (LTL formulas of type 3j ) with state
formulas j . Such formulas have the advantage that they can be
recursively defined by the following equations:
2j = j ^2j ;
3 j = j _3j :
This leads to the following equivalences:
(p ; j)  2j () V ¥i= j p (i)  j ,
(p ; j) 3j () W ¥i= j p (i)  j .
Although it is not feasible to consider all positions along an
infinite execution path, given an execution path p and a bound
k, it is easy to see that the following implications hold:
:
Vk
i= j p (i)  j =) (p ; j) 22j ,
Wk
i= j p (i)  j =) (p ; j) 3 j .
Therefore, it suffices to consider (sufficiently long) finite
prefixes of a given execution path p to disprove a safety
property2j and to prove a liveness property3j . In light of this
2For the syntax and semantics of other temporal operators (e.g., U (until)
and W (waiting-for)), the interested reader may refer to [17].
observation, bounded model checking can be formally defined
as follows:
Definition: Bounded Model Checking (BMC): Given a
system P = < G; I;T >, a state p (0)  I and a state formula
j , we have the following:
 If for some k, the formula
Vk
i=0 p (i)  j is not satisfiable,
then (p ;0)22j . In this case, the prefix p (0); p (1); :::; p (k)
is called a counterexample, which disproves the safety
property 2j . We call p (k) an error state.
 If for some k, the formula
Wk
i=0 p (i)  j is satisfiable, then
(p ;0) 3 j . In this case, the prefix p (0); p (1); :::; p (k) is
called a witness, which proves the liveness property 3j .
We call p (k) a witness state.
In practice, BMC is performed by progressively increasing
the bound until a counterexample or a witness is found.
However, this only yields a semi-decision procedure because
the validity of a formula can not be inferred from the absence of
bounded length counterexamples. Nevertheless, completeness
can be achieved for finite state systems [18] because for every
finite state system, there exists a bound K such that the absence
of counterexamples of length K or less implies that the formula
holds.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF BOUNDED MODEL CHECKING IN
J-SIM
In this section, we discuss how we implement the BMC
framework in J-Sim.
There are three major design goals in building the BMC
framework in J-Sim (or any other network simulators):
1) The core implementation of J-Sim should not be modi-
fied.
2) Only a minimal modification to the J-Sim code that
implements the network protocol is required.
3) The network protocol designer should not be over-
burdened with the details of the model checking process.
He/she should only provide the protocol specification
(in particular, the assertions that should be maintained
in the course of verification and validation) and define
the state of the protocol being model-checked, the set
of events that may trigger state transition, and how the
events are handled. Overall, the role of the network
protocol designer in model checking should be to provide
sufficient protocol specifics for the checking process to
proceed.
To realize the above design goals, we have implemented a
model checker in Java as a component, in the ACA of J-Sim.
The model checker checks a network protocol by executing the
J-Sim simulation code of that network protocol directly and
exploring the state space on the fly up to a maximum depth
MAX DEPT H. Figure 1 illustrates the overall framework of
incorporating bounded model checking into J-Sim. As shown
in Figure 1, the model checker interacts with instances of
J-Sim classes, P1, P2, ... , Pn, that implement the entities
comprising the network protocol being model-checked. The
network protocol designer specifies the safety and liveness
properties that need to be checked. The meaning of the safety





Fig. 1. Overall framework of bounded model checking in J-Sim.
For example, in case of a security protocol, a safety property is
that unauthorized users do not get access to the system and a
liveness property is that authorized users will be able to access
the system (e.g., a denial of service attack does not take place).
A state formula j is implemented as a function (in Java) whose
input is a state s and output is true/false. After the safety
and liveness properties are properly specified and the state
defined, the model checker starts from an initial state p (0) and
recursively generates successor system states by executing the
transitions T of the system. This process continues until either
a counterexample disproving a safety property or a witness
proving a liveness property is located (as shown in Figure 1) or
the state space is explored up to the specified maximum depth.
Definition of states: In order to explore the state space
created by a network protocol, the notion of the “state” has to be
adequately defined. As mentioned in Section II, the definition
of a state entails specifying the set of system variables G.
To this end, we have defined and implemented another class,
GlobalState, which includes the set of system variables and
the depth of the state as data members. A state is an instance
of the GlobalState class that assigns to each data member (i.e.,
system variable) a value as explained in Section II. It should be
noted that the implementation of GlobalState differs from one
network protocol to another; hence, it is the responsibility of the
protocol designer to provide an implementation of GlobalState.
In addition, the protocol designer should specify the initial
condition I and construct an initial state p (0)  I.
The model checking procedure, shown in Figure 2, keeps
track of three instances of GlobalState; namely, initialState (the
initial state p (0) of the network protocol), currentState (the
current state being explored) and nextState (one of the possible
successors of the current state). As shown in Figure 2, the two
major data structures are NonVisitedStates (which stores the
states that have not yet been visited) and AlreadyVisitedStates
(which stores the states that have already been visited). Figure 2
presents a stateful search that avoids visiting a state that has
already been visited before (i.e., a state that already exists in
AlreadyVisitedStates).
State transition: In each state in the state space, some
transitions (e.g., events) may or may not occur. Examples of
events in a network protocol are: packet arrival, packet loss and
timeout. It is also the responsibility of the network protocol
designer to specify (a) the set of transitions T that exist in
the network protocol, (b) when each transition occurs (e.g., a
packet arrival event occurs at a node n only if the network
contains a packet whose destination is n), and (c) how each
event is handled (i.e., an event handler function that makes a
transition from one state to another). Note that the network
protocol designer has to write the event handlers in order to
have a working prototype of the network protocol in J-Sim,
even if he/she does not intend to model check the protocol.
To help the protocol designer in defining the events that
trigger the state transition, we have made use of the reflec-
tion facilities [19] of the Java language and implemented a
Transition class as follows:
class Transition
f
/* check if the event can take place */
java.lang.reflect.Method EnablingFunction ;




For each possible event in the network protocol, the pro-
tocol designer needs only to (1) create an instance of the
Transition class, (2) use the java.lang.Class.getMethod() func-
tion to return a Method object that reflects the event’s en-
abling function and event’s event handler, and (3) use the
java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke() function to invoke the en-
abling function (Figure 2, line 19) and the event handler
(Figure 2, line 24).
As mentioned in Section II, a transition t maps a state s
into a set of states t(s). Therefore, a transition may generate
multiple successor states. For example, a packet arrival event
may generate multiple successor states. This is because if the
network contains two packets m1 and m2 whose destination
is node n, two successor states can be generated depending
on whether node n receives m1 first and then m2 or receives
m2 first and then m1. On the other hand, a node reboot
event generates only one successor state (namely, the state of
the node after reboot). In the model checking procedure, the
enabling function (Figure 2, line 19) should return the number
of possible successor states (zero if the event is disabled), i.e.,
the cardinality of t(s).
The model checking process: The model checking pro-
cedure shown in Figure 2 works in one of two modes:
DISPROVE SAFETY or PROVE LIVENESS. In the former,
the model checking procedure searches the state space for a
counterexample. In the latter, the model checking procedure
searches the state space for a witness. If the model checking
procedure is in the DISPROVE SAFETY mode, it first checks
if a safety property is violated in the initial state (Figure 2,
line 2). If so, the procedure terminates after notifying the
protocol designer that the initial state violates a safety prop-
erty. Similarly, if the model checking procedure is in the
PROVE LIVENESS mode and a liveness property holds in the
initial state (Figure 2, line 7), the procedure terminates after
notifying the protocol designer that the initial state satisfies a
liveness property.
If the initial state does not violate a safety property or satisfy
a liveness property, the model checking procedure starts with
an empty AlreadyVisitedStates (Figure 2, line 11) and Non-
5Procedure modelCheck()
f
/* The following are static data members of the ModelChecking class:
AlreadyVisitedStates, NonVisitedStates, initialState, currentState, nextState.
Depth of initialState = 0 */
1. if ( OperationMode == DISPROVE_SAFETY ) f /* if searching for a counterexample */
2. if ( verifySafety(initialState) == false ) f
3. Print("modelCheck: Safety property is violated at the initial state.") ;
4. initialState.printState() ; /* Print the error state */
5. exit ;
g /* end if safety property is violated at the initial state */
g /* end if searching for a counterexample */
6. else if ( OperationMode == PROVE_LIVENESS ) f /* if searching for a witness */
7. if ( verifyLiveness(initialState) == true ) f
8. Print("modelCheck: Liveness property holds at the initial state.") ;
9. initialState.printState() ; /* Print the witness state */
10. exit ;
g /* end if liveness property holds at the initial state */
g /* end else if searching for a witness */
11. AlreadyVisitedStates = f g ;
12. NonVisitedStates = f initialState g ;
13. while ( | NonVisitedStates | > 0 ) f
14. currentState = NonVisitedStates.removeFirst() ;
/* Explore currentState only if it has not been visited before */
15. if ( currentState does not exist in AlreadyVisitedStates ) f
16. AlreadyVisitedStates = AlreadyVisitedStates [ f currentState g ;
17. for ( all protocol entities p ) f /* for all the protocol entities in the network protocol */
18. for ( all possible events e ) f /* for all events that may take place */
/* Calculate the number of successor states that event e can generate for protocol entity p. */
/* For example, how many packets are destined to node p. */
/* Enabling function returns zero if event e is disabled. */
19. NumberOfNextStates = e.EnablingFunction(p) ;
20. for ( int i = 0 ; i < NumberOfNextStates ; i++ ) f /* for all possible successor states */
/* Copy the relevant state information from currentState to the protocol entities */
21. CopyFromModelToEntities(currentState) ;
22. nextState = currentState ; /* Start with nextState equal to currentState */
23. nextState.depth += 1 ; /* Increment the depth of nextState */
24. e.EventHandler(p) ; /* Invoke e’s event handler */
/* Copy the new relevant state information from the protocol entities to nextState */
25. CopyFromEntitiesToModel(nextState) ;
26. if (nextState does not exist in AlreadyVisitedStates) f
27. if ( OperationMode == DISPROVE_SAFETY ) f /* if searching for a counterexample */
28. if ( verifySafety(nextState) == false ) f
29. Print("modelCheck: FOUND ERROR STATE ") ;
30. nextState.printState() ; /* Print the error state */
31. Print("COUNTEREXAMPLE ") ;
32. printPath(nextState) ; /* Print the counterexample */
33. exit ;
g /* end if safety property is violated at the next state */
34. else f
35. if ( nextState.depth < MAX_DEPTH ) f /* Check if nextState needs to be explored */
36. NonVisitedStates = NonVisitedStates [ f nextState g ;
g
g /* end else */
g /* end if searching for a counterexample */
37. else if ( OperationMode == PROVE_LIVENESS ) f /* if searching for a witness */
38. if ( verifyLiveness(nextState) == true ) f
39. Print("modelCheck: FOUND WITNESS STATE ") ;
40. nextState.printState() ; /* Print the witness state */
41. Print("WITNESS ") ;
42. printPath(nextState) ; /* Print the witness */
43. exit ;
g /* end if liveness property holds at the next state */
44. else f
45. if ( nextState.depth < MAX_DEPTH ) f /* Check if nextState needs to be explored */
46. NonVisitedStates = NonVisitedStates [ f nextState g ;
g
g /* end else */
g /* end else if searching for a witness */
g /* end if nextState does not exist in AlreadyVisitedStates */
g /* end for all possible successor states */
g /* end for all the events that may take place */
g /* end for all the protocol entities in the network protocol */
g /* end if currentState has not been visited before */
g /* end while NonVisitedStates is not empty */
47. Print("No error or witness states were found. Ending model checking") ;
48. exit ;
g
Fig. 2. Bounded and stateful on-the-fly model checking procedure.
VisitedStates initially contains the initial state only (Figure 2,
line 12). As long as NonVisitedStates is not empty, the model
checking procedure removes a state from NonVisitedStates and
sets it to currentState (Figure 2, line 14) and starts exploring
6currentState if it has not been visited before (Figure 2, line
15). For each state being explored (currentState), the model
checking procedure generates all the possible successor states
(nextState) by executing the event handlers of the events that
can occur in currentState. However, since an event handler
is only invoked from the model checking procedure but ac-
tually executed inside the protocol entities themselves, the
model checking procedure must first restore the state of the
protocol entities to the state reflected in currentState before
the execution of the event handler. This is achieved by the
CopyFromModelToEntities() function call (Figure 2, line 21).
After the execution of the event handler (Figure 2 , line 24),
the CopyFromEntitiesToModel() function is called (Figure 2,
line 25) to extract the new state information from the protocol
entities and copy them to nextState.
If nextState has not been visited before (Figure 2, line 26),
the model checking procedure then checks whether nextState
violates a safety property (Figure 2, line 28) or satisfies a live-
ness property (Figure 2, line 38) in the DISPROVE SAFETY
or PROVE LIVENESS mode respectively. If not, nextState
is added to NonVisitedStates (Figure 2, line 36 and line 46
respectively) in order to be explored later if its depth is strictly
less than MAX DEPTH; otherwise, a counterexample or a
witness is printed by calling the printPath() function (Figure 2,
line 32 and line 42 respectively). The printPath() function is a
recursive function that traces the state space backwards from
nextState until initialState is reached.
Implementation: We have encountered two major imple-
mentation problems in the course of incorporating the model
checker into J-Sim: one is related to how network protocol
entities communicate with each other, with the model checker
in between; and the other is related to the ACA timers. We
describe below each of them and how we solved them while
keeping our design goals met.
Without model checking, protocol entities communicate with
each other via ports. However, when the network protocol is
model-checked and the model checker is used as shown in
Figure 1, the protocol entities need to communicate with each
other via the model checker. Initially, we simply connected the
ports of each protocol entity to those of the model checker,
but then found that protocol-specific data/control messages
generated by the protocol entities during the execution of an
event handler may not be forwarded to the model checker at
the required time. This is because the model checker does not
wait until the protocol entities finish executing an event handler.
This may cause the model checker to exclude some of the new
state’s information in nextState. We solved this problem by
setting the ports that are involved in the interaction between
the model checker and the protocol entities to the function-call
execution model instead of the default independence execution
model [8]. In the function-call execution model, the model
checker waits until the protocol entities finish executing an
event handler; therefore, this solution ensures that all the new
state’s information will be included in nextState. Although this
solution requires modest modification to the J-Sim simulation
code of the network protocol, we believe that this modification
is minimal. Alternatively, one may make the modification in a
subclass of the J-Sim class of a network protocol entity, thus
keeping the original parent J-Sim class unmodified.
The second problem is related to the ACA timers. Without
model checking, a protocol entity that uses an ACA timer
sets the timer to a pre-determined time interval. Upon timer
expiration, a timeout event is triggered if the timer is still
active. If the network protocol is to be model-checked, the
model checker should explore all the possible transitions from a
given state, and should not be limited to a single timeout value
for each timer3. Instead, the model checker should trigger the
timeout event when that event may occur in the real world. For
example, a typical retransmission timer in a reliable unicast
protocol may expire at any time as long as there is a pending
data message that has been sent but not yet acknowledged.
This problem can be easily solved by modifying the core
implementation of J-Sim. However, this violates our first design
goal. Therefore, we chose to make this modification also at a
subclass of the J-Sim class of a network protocol entity.
IV. EVALUATION AND RESULTS
In this section, we explain how we use the model checking
framework to model-check the implementation of the Ad-Hoc
On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol in J-
Sim. We first summarize the AODV protocol and then elaborate
on how we built the AODV model. Following that, we present
our experimental results.
A. Ad-Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing
The Ad-Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing
protocol [20] is a well-known and widely-used reactive mul-
tihop routing protocol for ad hoc networks. AODV is reactive
in the sense that a route to a given destination is established
via a route discovery process only when it is needed by a
source node (i.e., traffic-driven). In this section, we describe the
implementation of AODV in J-Sim (which is based on AODV
Draft (version 11) [14]).
Each node n in the ad hoc network maintains a routing
table. A routing table entry for a destination d contains, in
addition to other fields, a next hop address nexthopn;d (the
address of the node to which packets destined to destination
d are forwarded), a hop count hopsn;d (the number of hops
needed to reach the destination d) and a destination sequence
number seqnon;d (a measure of the freshness of the route
information). Each routing table entry has a lifetime. Periodi-
cally, every ROUTE CACHE FREQUENCY seconds, a route
timeout event is triggered causing the invalidation (but not
deletion) of all the routing table entries that have not been
used (e.g., to send or forward packets to the destination) for
a time interval that is greater than the lifetime. Invalidating a
routing table entry involves incrementing seqnon;d and setting
hopsn;d to ¥ . If a new route to destination d is offered to node n,
node n compares the destination sequence number of the offered
route to the destination sequence number of the current route,
and accepts the route with the greater sequence number. If the
sequence numbers are the same, the offered route is accepted
3We assume that setting of the interval of a timer may differ from one run
of the protocol to another; otherwise, this approach may suffer from excessive
false positives.
7only if it has a smaller hop count than the hop count in the
routing table entry.
Each node n also maintains two monotonically increasing
counters: a node sequence number seqnon and a broadcast
ID bidn. When a node n requires a route to a destination
d, if it does not already have a routing table entry to the
destination d, it creates an invalid routing table entry to the
destination d with hopsn;d set to ¥ . Node n then broadcasts
a route request (RREQ) packet containing the following fields
< n;seqnon;bidn;d;seqnon;d;hopCountq > and then increments
bidn. The hopCountq field is initialized to 1. The pair <
n;bidn > uniquely identifies a RREQ packet.
When a node receives a RREQ, if it has already received
a RREQ with the same source address and broadcast ID, it
discards the RREQ; otherwise, it either satisfies the RREQ by
unicasting a route reply (RREP) packet back to the requesting
node if it has a fresh enough route to the destination (or it
is the destination itself) or rebroadcasts the RREQ to its own
neighbors after incrementing the hopCountq field if it does
not have a fresh enough route to the destination (nor is it the
destination itself). An intermediate node determines whether it
has a fresh enough route to the destination by comparing the
destination sequence number in its own routing table entry to
the seqnon;d field in the RREQ packet. Each intermediate node
also records a reverse route to the requesting node; this reverse
route can be used to send/forward route replies to the requesting
node. The requesting node’s sequence number seqnon is used
to maintain the freshness of the reverse route.
A RREP packet sent by an intermediate node m contains the
following fields < hopCountp;d;seqnom;d ;n >. The hopCountp
field is initialized to 1 + hopsm;d . If it is the destination d
that sends the RREP packet, it first increments seqnod (i.e.,
seqnod seqnod+2) and then sends a RREP packet containing
the following fields < 1;d;seqnod;n >. The unicast RREP
travels back to the requesting node via the reverse route.
Each intermediate node along the reverse route sets up a
forward pointer to the node from which the RREP came, thus
establishing a forward route to the destination, increments the
hopCountp field and forwards the RREP packet to the next
hop towards the requesting node. Each node receiving a RREQ
keeps the pair < n;bidn > in a broadcast ID cache so that it
can later check if it has already received a RREQ with the
same source address and broadcast ID. Each entry in this cache
has a lifetime. Periodically, every BCAST ID SAVE seconds, a
broadcast ID timeout event is triggered causing the deletion of
all the entries in the cache that have expired (i.e., remained in
the cache for a duration that is at least equal to the lifetime).
In a mobile ad hoc network, the topology of the network
may change due to node mobility. As the nodes move relative
to each other, existing wireless links between nodes may get
broken and new links may be established. The implementation
of AODV in J-Sim supports two mechanisms to detect broken
links: a link layer mechanism and a network layer mechanism.
In the link layer mechanism, the link layer (e.g., IEEE 802.11)
detects a broken link (e.g., by the absence of a link layer ACK
each time a packet is transmitted to the next hop; or the failure
to get a CTS after sending an RTS each time a packet needs
to be transmitted to the next hop and the retry count exceeds
the maximum retry limit). Upon detecting a broken link, the
link layer notifies the AODV process. In turn, the AODV
process executes a broken link event handler. Specifically, if
the broken link is closer to the destination than the source, the
node attempts a local repair by sending a RREQ to discover
a route to the destination; otherwise, the node invalidates the
routing table entries to all the destinations that have become
unreachable due to the broken link, and broadcasts a route
error (RRER) packet announcing the node IDs of all these
unreachable destinations. On the other hand, in the network
layer mechanism (which is optional in both the AODV Draft
(version 11) [14] and the implementation of AODV in J-Sim),
each node has a neighbors list that contains the node IDs of
its neighbors. Neighboring nodes exchange HELLO packets
to establish and maintain the neighborhood information. Each
entry in the neighbors list has a lifetime. On receiving a HELLO
packet, a node creates an entry (or refreshes the lifetime of
an existing entry if one already exists) for the source node
in the neighbors list. Periodically, every HELLO INT ERVAL
seconds, a neighbor timeout event is triggered, causing the
deletion of all the entries in the neighbors list that have expired.
B. Building the AODV Model
In this section, we explain the steps that we followed in order
to build the AODV model. These steps constitute a generic
methodology for building a model for any other network
protocol that needs to be model-checked in J-Sim.
Definition of a state: For AODV, we define GlobalState as
a tuple that has two components; namely, the protocol state and
the network cloud. The protocol state includes data members
that represent the state of the protocol entities; i.e., the wireless
nodes in the ad hoc network. Specifically, the protocol state
includes each node’s sequence number seqnon, broadcast ID
bidn, routing table and the broadcast ID cache that keeps the
information of the previously received RREQ packets. The
network cloud models the network as a black box that contains
the AODV packets (e.g., RREQ, RREP) and also maintains the
neighborhood information. A broadcast AODV packet whose
source is node s is modeled as a set of packets, each of which
is destined to one of the neighbors of s.
In the initial global state, the network does not contain any
packets and each of the wireless nodes is initialized as specified
by the constructor of the AODV class in J-Sim. Specifically,
each wireless node starts with an empty routing table, empty
broadcast ID cache, seqnon = 2 and bidn = 1.
Safety and liveness properties: In AODV, an important
safety property is the loop-free property. Consider two nodes n
and m such that m is the next hop of n to some destination d;
i.e., nexthopn;d = m. The loop-free property can be expressed
formally in LTL notation as follows [21], [22]:
(p ;0) 2 ( (seqnon;d < seqnom;d)_
(seqnon;d == seqnom;d ^hopsn;d > hopsm;d)):
Informally, the loop-free property requires that either m has
a more fresh route to d than n (i.e., a route with a greater
destination sequence number) or m has a shorter route that is
equally fresh.
8A desirable liveness property in a routing protocol, such as
AODV, is that nodes that require a route to a destination d will
eventually have a valid routing table entry to the destination




n 6=d ReqRoute(n;d)!3hopsn;d 6= ¥
where ReqRoute(n;d) is true if node n requires a route to a
destination d. Assuming all nodes n 6= d require a route to d,
the liveness property can be stated as follows:
(p ;0) 
V
n 6=d3hopsn;d 6= ¥
State transitions: The following step is to specify the
set of transitions, when each transition occurs, and how each
transition is handled. The state transitions can be classified
into two categories: node transitions (i.e., transitions that are
triggered inside a node) and network transitions (i.e., transitions
that are triggered inside the network). The transitions in each
category can be listed as follows:
1) Node Transitions
a) Initiation of a route request to a destination d: This
event is enabled if the node does not have a valid
routing table entry to the destination d. The event
is handled by broadcasting a RREQ packet.
b) Restart of the AODV process at node n: This event
may take place because of a node reboot. The event
is always enabled and is handled by reinitializing
the state of the AODV process at node n. Specif-
ically, the AODV process at node n restarts with
an empty routing table, empty broadcast ID cache,
seqnon = 2 and bidn = 1.
c) Broadcast ID timeout event at node n: This event
is enabled if there is at least one entry in the
broadcast ID cache of node n. The event is handled
by deleting the entries in the broadcast ID cache
that have expired. The broadcast ID timeout event
may generate multiple successor states depending
on which entries in the cache are deleted.
d) Timeout of route to destination d at node n: This
event is enabled if node n has a valid routing table
entry to destination d in its routing table. The event
is handled by invalidating this routing table entry.
e) Neighbor timeout event at node n: This event is
enabled if there is at least one entry in the neighbors
list of node n. The event is handled by deleting
the entries in the neighbors list that have expired.
The neighbor timeout event may generate multiple
successor states depending on which entries in the
neighbors list are deleted.
2) Network Transitions
a) Delivering an AODV packet to node n: This event is
enabled if the network contains at least one AODV
packet such that n is the destination of the packet
(or the next hop towards the destination) and n is
one of the neighbors of the source of the packet.
The event is handled by removing one of these
packets from the network and forwarding it to the
node n in order to be processed according to the
AODV implementation. As mentioned above, this is
an example of an event that may generate multiple
successor states.
b) Loss of an AODV packet destined to node n: This
event is enabled if the network contains at least one
AODV packet such that n is the destination of the
packet. The event is handled by removing one of
these AODV packets from the network. Similar to
the reception of an AODV packet event, this event
may generate multiple successor states depending
on which packet in the network is lost.
C. Model Checking the AODV Protocol
In this section, we discuss how we made use of protocol-
specific properties and heuristics to facilitate a best-first search
strategy and to handle the state space explosion problem. In
addition, we present several counterexamples and witnesses
that the model checker can find, and discuss the effect of the
search strategy on the time and space overheads needed to find
these counterexamples and witnesses. All of the experiments
presented in this section were run on a Pentium 4 2.66 GHz
machine running Red Hat Linux 8.0 kernel version 2.4.18 with
1 GB memory.
Use of protocol-specific properties to facilitate a best-first
search strategy: While model checking AODV, we made use of
three search strategies in exploring the state space: breadth-first,
depth-first and best-first. Although breadth-first search is the
most straightforward search strategy and is guaranteed to find
the shortest path to an error/witness, it may run out of memory
before reaching any error/witness state. Depth-first search tries
to alleviate this problem at the price of finding a (possibly)
longer counterexample/witness in (possibly) more time. The
purpose of best-first search is to explore states that may
potentially lead to an error/witness state first, thereby reducing
the time needed to locate error/witness states. Protocol-specific
metrics are exploited to specify how a state is considered
“better” or more likely to lead to an error/witness state.
A suitable best-first search strategy for exploring the state
space of AODV can be obtained by inspecting the loop-free
property stated in Section IV-B. A node, which does not have a
routing table entry to the destination d or has an invalid routing
table entry to the destination d, does not affect the truth value
of the loop-free property. Therefore, a suitable best-first search
strategy (which we will call Best-first Search 1) is to consider
a state s1 better than another state s2 if the number of valid
routing table entries in s1 is greater than the corresponding
quantity in s2. This best-first search strategy turns out to be also
useful when searching for a witness for the liveness property
stated in Section IV-B as will be shown later.
In order to study the effect of the choice of the best-first
search strategy, we investigate another best-first search strategy
(which we will call Best-first Search 2) that was also obtained
by inspecting the loop-free property stated in Section IV-B. The
loop-free property can be rewritten as follows:
(p ;0) 2 ( ((seqnon;d   seqnom;d )< 0)_
(seqnon;d == seqnom;d ^ ((hopsm;d  hopsn;d)< 0))):
90 1 2 N-1N-2
Fig. 3. An ad hoc network consisting of a chain of N nodes.
Therefore, the greater the quantity (seqnon;d   seqnom;d)
and/or the greater the quantity (hopsm;d   hopsn;d) in a state,
the more likely this state is close to an error state. Hence, in
Best-first Search 2, we consider a state s1 better than another
state s2 if the following summation
S =
å n 6=d((seqnon;d  seqnom;d)+(hopsm;d hopsn;d))
is greater in s1 than the corresponding summation in s2, where
nexthopn;d = m. The summation S includes only the nodes n
and m that have valid routing table entries to the destination
d. If none of the nodes have a valid routing table entry to the
destination d, S is set to  ¥ (i.e., least interesting).
Use of protocol-specific heuristics to handle the state
space explosion: Obviously, the state space of the AODV
protocol is infinite. Furthermore, there is an infinite number of
possible initial states depending on the number of nodes and
the neighborhood information. In order to handle the state space
explosion problem, we made use of the following heuristics:
1) For the initial state, we consider two ad hoc network
topologies only: a chain topology (Figure 3) and a grid
topology (Figure 4). All wireless links are assumed to
be bidirectional. In Figures 3- 4, a bidirectional arrow
exists between nodes i and j if and only if i is within the
transmission radius of j and j is within the transmission
radius of i; i.e., both i and j can reach each other in one
hop.
2) We consider only one destination node d; namely, d =
N 1 in the chain topology and d = M2 1 in the grid
topology. Therefore, all RREQ packets request a route
to d and the route timeout event invalidates the routing
table entry to d only. Furthermore, the loop-free property
checks the absence of routing loops to d only and the
liveness property requires the presence of valid routing
table entries to d only at all the other nodes.
3) Since the network layer mechanism of detecting broken
links is optional in both the AODV Draft (version 11) [14]
and the implementation of AODV in J-Sim, we ignore the
neighbor timeout event. This reduces both the number of
events and the number of states in the state space.
Clearly, pruning the state space due to ignoring events and/or
states and exploring the state space up to a maximum depth may
cause the model checker to miss errors/witnesses (e.g., errors
that may manifest themselves only in large networks, but not in
small networks). However, in spite of pruning the state space,
the model checker was still able to find interesting errors and
witnesses as explained below.
Effect of the search strategy: In this subsection, we study
the effect of the search strategy on the performance of the model
checker with respect to the time and space overheads required
for finding three counterexamples and one witness. The initial
state of the ad hoc network is a chain topology consisting of
0 1 2 M-1M-2
M M+1 M+2 2M-12M-2
M2-2M M2-2M+1 M2-2M+2 M2-M-1M2-M-2
M2-M M2-M+1 M2-M+2 M2-1M2-2
Fig. 4. An ad hoc network consisting of a grid of M  M nodes.
3 nodes: n0, n1 and n2. Although this initial state is simple,
it ensures that n0 requires a multihop route to reach n2; i.e.,
AODV multihop routing is needed. In addition, if an error may
occur in a small network, it may also occur in a large network.
MAX DEPT H was set to 15.
Counterexample 1 - Using a breadth-first search strategy
with all the state transitions mentioned in Section IV-B, the
model checker finds an error in the J-Sim implementation,
whose trace is shown in Figure 5, in 65.79 minutes. When the
packet loss and route timeout events are ignored, the breadth-
first search strategy finds the error in 13.45 minutes. Table I
and Table II respectively give the time overhead and the space
overhead (in terms of the number of states in the stateful search)
needed to locate the error for a breadth-first search strategy. As
shown in Tables I- II, ignoring some events (namely, the packet
loss and route timeout events) may provide 79.55% reduction
in time overhead and 52.25% reduction in space overhead.
The counterexample, shown in Figure 5, can be explained
as follows. State 1 is the initial state. In state 2, n0 initiates
a route request to the destination n2 by broadcasting a RREQ
packet. Similarly, in state 3, n1 initiates a route request to the
destination n2 by broadcasting a RREQ packet. In state 4, n1
receives the RREQ packet sent by n0 and since neither does it
have a route to the destination nor is it the destination itself, it
rebroadcasts the RREQ packet. In state 5, n2 receives the RREQ
packet sent by n1 in state 3 and since it is the destination itself,
it responds by unicasting a RREP packet after incrementing
seqno2. In state 6, n2 receives the RREQ packet sent by n0
in state 2 and since it is the destination itself, it responds by
unicasting a RREP packet after incrementing seqno2. In state
7, n1 receives the RREP that is destined to n0 and forwards
it to n0. In addition, n1 sets up a forward pointer to the node
from which the RREP came (i.e., n2), thus establishing a valid
routing table entry to the destination n2 (note the change of the
hop count field from ¥ in state 6 to 1 in state 7 and the change




Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=6 next=1
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2
Node 2 seqno=6; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1, BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0)
COUNTEREXAMPLE
State 1 Depth = 0
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network Empty
State 2 Depth = 1
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network RREQ(src:0--dest:1)
State 3 Depth = 2
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network RREQ(src:0--dest:1), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:2)
State 4 Depth = 3
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:2), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:2)
State 5 Depth = 4
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:2), RREP(src:2--dest:1--seqno:4)
State 6 Depth = 5
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=6; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1, BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREP(src:2--dest:1--seqno:4), RREP(src:2--dest:0--seqno:6)
State 7 Depth = 6
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=6 next=2, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=6; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1, BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREP(src:2--dest:1--seqno:4), RREP(src:1--dest:0--seqno:6)
State 8 Depth = 7
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=6 next=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=6 next=2, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=6; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1, BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREP(src:2--dest:1--seqno:4)
State 9 Depth = 8
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=6 next=1
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 2 seqno=6; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1, BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREP(src:2--dest:1--seqno:4)
State 10 Depth = 9
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=6 next=1
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2
Node 2 seqno=6; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1, BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0)
Total Time = 3947493.0 msecs.
Fig. 5. Trace of counterexample 1 obtained using breadth-first search.
In state 8, n0 receives the RREP packet and establishes a valid
routing table entry to the destination n2. In state 9, the AODV
process in n1 restarts and in state 10, n1 receives the RREP
packet that was sent by n2 in state 5 in which seqno2 was set
to 4. n1 establishes a valid routing table entry to the destination
n2. Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 5, nexthop0;2 = 1 but
seqno0;2 > seqno1;2; i.e., a routing loop is created.
It should be noted, however, that if the restart of the AODV
process at n1 in state 9 was because of a node reboot, the link
layer of n0 may be able to detect that the link between n0
and n1 was broken causing the invocation of the broken link
event handler (Section IV-A), and preventing the routing loop
from taking place. On the other hand, if the link layer does not
detect broken links fast enough (e.g., if the link layer issues a
link layer notification of a broken link only if it has data packets
that need to be transmitted to an active next hop, then a node
may reboot while its neighbor does not detect it because the
rate of sending data packets may be too low), then the routing
loop may occur.
As for the network layer mechanism of detecting broken
links, according to AODV Draft (version 11) [14], if a node
does not receive any packets (HELLO or otherwise) from one
of its neighbors for more than ALLOWED HELLO LOSS
HELLO INT ERVAL, it should assume that the link to this
neighbor is currently lost and invalidate the routing table
entries to the destinations that became unreachable because
of this broken link and broadcast a RERR packet. However,
we discover that the AODV implementation in J-Sim does not
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TABLE I
TIME OVERHEAD OF FINDING COUNTEREXAMPLE 1: TIME NEEDED TO
LOCATE THE ERROR (IN SEC.).
Breadth-first Depth-first Best-first Best-first
Search Search Search 1 Search 2
Considering all state 3947.493 5513.528 1.656 234.374
transitions
Ignoring packet loss and 807.185 574.555 0.157 53.540
route timeout events
follow this part of specification. Specifically, in the AODV
implementation in J-Sim, if a node does not receive any packets
(HELLO or otherwise) from one of its neighbors for more
than 1:5ALLOW ED HELLO LOSSHELLO INT ERVAL,
it deletes the neighbor’s information from the neighbors list
mentioned in Section IV-A, without invalidating the routing ta-
ble entries to the destinations that became unreachable because
of the broken link or broadcasting a RERR packet. Furthermore,
as stated in AODV Draft (version 11) [14], after a node reboot,
a node waits for DELETE PERIOD. During this time, the
node does not transmit any RREP packets, and if it receives
a data packet for some other destination, it should broadcast a
RERR packet and must reset the waiting timer to expire after
the current time plus DELETE PERIOD. We found that the
AODV implementation in J-Sim does not follow this part of
specification either. It was shown in [23] that by the time the
rebooted node comes out of the waiting phase and becomes an
active router again, none of its neighbors will be using it as an
active next hop any more.
Table I gives the time needed to locate the error in all the
three search strategies, while Table II shows the space overhead
in terms of the number of states in the stateful search. Best-
first Search 1 can reduce both the time and space overhead by
several orders of magnitude. However, this comes at the price
of a (possibly) longer counterexample, which was 16 states
in the best-first search compared to 10 states in the breadth-
first search. Nevertheless, the choice of the best-first search
strategy affects both the time and space overheads needed to
locate the error. As shown in Tables I- II, Best-first Search 2
incurs a two order of magnitude increase in time overhead and
a one order of magnitude increase in space overhead, when
compared to Best-first Search 1. The reason why Best-first
Search 2 performed worse than Best-first Search 1 is that Best-
first Search 2 requires a node (and its next hop towards the
destination) to have valid routing table entries to the destination.
This may not be true at the first stages (i.e., lower depths) of
the search space. Therefore, in the first stages of the search, the
nonvisited states may look equally interesting and thus, Best-
first Search 2 may not be able to explore the states that are most
likely to lead to the error first. This causes Best-first Search 2 to
take more time and explore more states than Best-first Search 1.
We leave the question of how to determine the “best” best-first
search strategy to future research work.
To demonstrate the powerfulness of BMC and to further
study the performance of the various search strategies, we
manually injected the following two errors, in addition to the
error found above.
Counterexample 2 - The first error that we manually in-
TABLE II
SPACE OVERHEAD OF FINDING COUNTEREXAMPLE 1: NUMBER OF STATES
IN THE STATEFUL SEARCH.
Breadth-first Depth-first Best-first Best-first
Search Search Search 1 Search 2
Considering all state 26013 4758 384 1792
transitions
Ignoring packet loss and 12421 2536 102 2304
route timeout events
jected is not to increment the destination sequence number
when invalidating a routing table entry. In order not to get
the same counterexample shown in Figure 5, we required that
the counterexample should contain at least one state that is
generated due to a route timeout event because the route timeout
event triggers the invalidation of a routing table entry. Using
a breadth-first search strategy with all the state transitions
mentioned in Section IV-B, the model checker found an error
in 1.5792 hour using space overhead of 29083 states. Using a
depth-first search strategy, the model checker finds the error,
whose trace is shown in Figure 6, using space overhead of
only 9068 states but at the price of taking 13.7788 hours.
Furthermore, the length of the counterexample found using the
depth-first search strategy was 16 states, but the length of the
counterexample found using the breadth-first search strategy
was only 10 states.
The counterexample, shown in Figure 6, can be explained
as follows. State 1 is the initial state. In state 2, n1 initiates
a route request to the destination n2 by broadcasting a RREQ
packet. In state 3, the RREQ packet that was destined to n2 is
lost. In state 4, the AODV process at n1 restarts. In state 5, n1
initiates a route request to the destination n2 by broadcasting a
RREQ packet. In state 6, the RREQ packet that was destined
to n2 is lost. In state 7, the AODV process at n1 restarts. In
state 8, n0 initiates a route request to the destination n2 by
broadcasting a RREQ packet. In state 9, n1 receives the RREQ
packet sent by n0 and since neither does it have a route to the
destination nor is it the destination itself, it rebroadcasts the
RREQ packet. In state 10, n2 receives the RREQ packet sent
by n0 in state 8 and since it is the destination itself, it responds
by unicasting a RREP packet after incrementing seqno2. In state
11, n1 receives the RREP that is destined to n0 and forwards
it to n0. In addition, n1 sets up a forward pointer to the node
from which the RREP came (i.e., n2), thus establishing a valid
routing table entry to the destination n2. In state 12, the route
timeout event takes place at n1 causing the invalidation of the
routing table entry to n2 (note the change of the hop count field
from 1 in state 11 to ¥ in state 12) without incrementing the
destination sequence number. In state 13, the AODV process
at n0 restarts. In state 14, n0 receives the RREP packet and
establishes a valid routing table entry to the destination n2. In
state 15, n0 receives a RREQ packet sent by n1 and since it
has a fresh enough route to the destination n2, it responds by
unicasting a RREP packet. In state 16, n1 receives the RREP
packet and since the destination sequence number field in the
RREP packet is equal to the destination sequence number field
in the routing table entry to n2 and the hop count field in the
RREP packet is less than the hop count field in the routing table
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TABLE III
TIME OVERHEAD OF FINDING COUNTEREXAMPLE 2: TIME NEEDED TO
LOCATE THE ERROR (IN SEC.).
Breadth-first Depth-first Best-first Best-first
Search Search Search 1 Search 2
Considering all state 5685.178 49603.651 0.132 232.978
transitions
TABLE IV
SPACE OVERHEAD OF FINDING COUNTEREXAMPLE 2: NUMBER OF STATES
IN THE STATEFUL SEARCH.
Breadth-first Depth-first Best-first Best-first
Search Search Search 1 Search 2
Considering all state 29083 9068 93 1786
transitions
entry to n2, n1 accepts the new offered route and establishes
a valid routing table entry to the destination n2. Nevertheless,
as shown in Figure 6, nexthop0;2 = 1 and nexthop1;2 = 0; i.e.,
a routing loop is created.
Tables III and IV give, respectively, the time and space
overheads needed to locate the error using the three search
strategies. Similar to the results presented above, a best-first
search strategy can provide several orders of magnitude reduc-
tion in both time and space overheads.
Counterexample 3 - The second error that we manually
injected is to delete (instead of invalidating) a routing ta-
ble entry when its lifetime expires. In order not to get the
same counterexample shown in Figure 5, we required that
the counterexample should contain at least one state that is
generated due to a route timeout event because the route
timeout event triggers the deletion of a routing table entry.
Using a breadth-first search strategy with all the state transitions
mentioned in Section IV-B, the model checker found an error
in 59.31 minutes using space overhead of 24966 states. Using
Best-first Search 1, the model checker finds the error, whose
trace is shown in Figure 7, in only 0.137 second using space
overhead of only 93 states but at the price of finding a longer
counterexample – the length of the counterexample found using
the best-first search strategy was 16 states, but the length of the
counterexample found using the breadth-first search strategy
was only 10 states.
States 1-11 of the counterexample can be explained as ex-
plained in the previous errors. In state 12, both n0 and n1 have
valid routing table entries to n2. In state 13, the route timeout
event takes place at n1 causing the deletion of the routing
table entry to n2. In state 14, n1 initiates a route request to
the destination n2 by broadcasting a RREQ packet. In state 15,
n0 receives the RREQ packet sent by n1 and since it has a fresh
enough route to the destination n2, it responds by unicasting
a RREP packet. In state 16, n1 receives the RREP packet and
since the destination sequence number field in the RREP packet
is greater than the destination sequence number field in the
routing table entry to n2, n1 accepts the new offered route
and establishes a valid routing table entry to the destination
n2. Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 7, nexthop0;2 = 1 and
nexthop1;2 = 0; i.e., a routing loop is created.
Tables V and VI give, respectively, the time and space
TABLE V
TIME OVERHEAD OF FINDING COUNTEREXAMPLE 3: TIME NEEDED TO
LOCATE THE ERROR (IN SEC.).
Breadth-first Depth-first Best-first Best-first
Search Search Search 1 Search 2
Considering all state 3558.614 5046.795 0.137 231.961
transitions
TABLE VI
SPACE OVERHEAD OF FINDING COUNTEREXAMPLE 3: NUMBER OF STATES
IN THE STATEFUL SEARCH.
Breadth-first Depth-first Best-first Best-first
Search Search Search 1 Search 2
Considering all state 24966 4637 93 1783
transitions
overheads needed to locate the error using the three search
strategies. Similar to the results presented above, a best-first
search strategy can reduce both the time and space overhead
by several orders of magnitude.
In addition to evaluating the ability of the J-Sim model
checker to find a counterexample of a safety property, we
have studied its ability to find a witness for the liveness
property specified in Section IV-B. Tables VII and VIII give,
respectively, the time and space overheads needed to find the
witness using the three search strategies. A best-first search
strategy can reduce both the time and space overhead, needed
to find a witness for the liveness property, by several orders of
magnitude.
Effect of the size and/or the topology of the network:
In this subsection, we study the effect of the size and/or the
topology of the network on the performance of the model
checker with respect to the time and space overheads required
for finding a counterexample and a witness. To study the effect
of the size of the network, Table IX gives the time and space
overheads needed to find Counterexample 3 in a chain topology
consisting of N nodes using Best-first Search 1. To study the
effect of the topology and the size of the network, Table X
gives the time and space overheads needed to find a witness
in a grid topology consisting of MM nodes using Best-first
Search 1.
V. RELATED WORK
Conventional model checkers (e.g., SPIN [24], SMV [25],
Murphi [26]) require that the system be first specified using
a high-level modeling language. The process of describing the
system in a high-level modeling language is a time-consuming,
painstaking, and error-prone process. To deal with this, there
has been some work (e.g., [27], Java PathFinder [28], and
Bandera [29]) on translating programming languages (e.g.,
Java) into the input modeling languages of several conventional
model checkers. The idea is to automatically extract an abstract
model out of an application written in Java and then use
conventional model checking to analyze this abstract model.
However, this may not be always feasible, as it requires that
each language feature of Java must have a corresponding one
in the destination modeling language.
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TABLE VII
TIME OVERHEAD OF FINDING A WITNESS FOR THE LIVENESS PROPERTY
SPECIFIED IN SECTION IV-B: TIME NEEDED TO LOCATE THE WITNESS (IN
SEC.).
Breadth-first Depth-first Best-first Best-first
Search Search Search 1 Search 2
Considering all state 0.61 4.047 0.098 1.26
transitions
TABLE VIII
SPACE OVERHEAD OF FINDING A WITNESS FOR THE LIVENESS PROPERTY
SPECIFIED IN SECTION IV-B: NUMBER OF STATES IN THE STATEFUL
SEARCH.
Breadth-first Depth-first Best-first Best-first
Search Search Search 1 Search 2
Considering all state 552 240 58 154
transitions
Conventional model checkers have also been used in formal
reasoning of distributed systems. In [30], SMV is used to verify
three cache coherence protocols used in distributed file systems;
however, each cache coherence protocol has to be modeled
using the SMV input language and then SMV checks that model
rather than the actual implementation. In [31], the process of
writing the model is automated by using an extensible compiler,
xg++, that can automatically extract a model (described in
the Murphi input language) from the original implementation
code. Compared to [31], our goal is not to extract a model,
but instead to model check the J-Sim implementation code
itself. Teapot [32] is a domain-specific language for writing
cache coherence protocols, and offers further improvement
over [30] and [31]. The Teapot compiler can translate a protocol
specification to both executable C code and code that can be
input to Murphi, and hence potential discrepancies between the
specification and the actual executable code can be eliminated.
Our approach differs from Teapot in that it does not require
an input protocol specification and does not generate an output
executable code. Furthermore, since the model checker is built
in J-Sim, there is no need to use an existing model checker
such as Murphi.
As mentioned above, the J-Sim model checker checks a
network protocol by executing the J-Sim implementation code
of that network protocol directly and exploring the state space
on the fly. This is inspired by the previous work on model
checking the implementation code directly (e.g., CMC [22] and
Verisoft [33]) for C and C++. Although CMC has been applied
to model check implementations of networking code (namely,
the AODV routing protocol [14]), our approach differs from
CMC in two aspects: (a) our goal is to model check the network
protocol while it is being designed (using J-Sim) rather than
after it is implemented; and (b) we focus on Java rather than
C or C++. Several errors found using CMC were caused by
implementation errors (e.g., using the result of a routing table
lookup without checking for NULL or using invalid routing
table entries to send routing updates); such errors do not exist
in the implementation of AODV in J-Sim.
A more recent version of Java PathFinder [34] performs
model checking at the bytecode level. However, this involves
building a new Java Virtual Machine JVMJPF , which is called
TABLE IX
TIME (SEC.) AND SPACE (NUMBER OF STATES IN THE STATEFUL SEARCH)
OVERHEADS OF FINDING COUNTEREXAMPLE 3 IN A CHAIN TOPOLOGY
CONSISTING OF N NODES USING BEST-FIRST SEARCH 1.







TIME (SEC.) AND SPACE (NUMBER OF STATES IN THE STATEFUL SEARCH)
OVERHEADS OF FINDING A WITNESS IN A GRID TOPOLOGY CONSISTING OF
MM NODES USING BEST-FIRST SEARCH 1.
MM Time (sec.) Number of states
2  2 0.334 140
3  3 12.375 2014
4  4 209.196 10112
from the model checker, to interpret bytecode generated by a
Java compiler. Compared to [34], our approach has an important
advantage of not requiring any modifications to the Java Virtual
Machine. As far as formal analysis of network simulation is
concerned, the only existing work is Verisim [35], which was
developed based on a collection of pre-existing tools, i.e., ns-
2 [5] and the MaC monitoring and checking framework [36].
Verisim replaces the monitor component of MaC by ns-2 and
uses the checker component of MaC to verify user-defined
properties on traces produced by ns-2. It should be noted,
however, that not all errors may manifest themselves in a trace
because ns-2 does not explore all possible execution paths
during a simulation run.
Maude [37] is a reflective language and system that sup-
ports both equational and rewriting logic specification and
programming. Maude is extremely powerful and can be used to
create executable specifications for a wide range of applications
(e.g., other languages, theorem provers, concurrent systems). In
fact, Maude can even be used to build language extensions
for Maude itself. For example, Full Maude is implemented
in Maude as an extension of (Core) Maude [38]. Concurrent
object-oriented systems can be specified in Full Maude by
means of object-oriented modules that can be executed and
also model-checked with a Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) model
checker. In [39], we have compared the performance of the J-
Sim model checker against that of Maude, and shown that the
former outperforms the latter in model checking a stop-and-wait
ARQ protocol.
Bhargavan et al. provide in [21] a complete automated proof,
using the SPIN model checker and the HOL theorem prover,
that no routing loops will be formed by AODV if all the nodes
in the ad hoc network (a) always immediately detect when a
neighbor restarts its AODV process and the restart is treated
as if all links to the neighbor have broken, (b) increment
the destination sequence number of a routing table entry to
a destination when the route to that destination has expired
or broken, and (c) never delete routing table entries. In this
paper, we have shown how the model checker in J-Sim can
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discover routing loops caused by violation of each of these
three conditions.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper documents our ongoing research on extending J-
Sim, an open-source component-based compositional network
simulation and emulation environment, with the capability of
validating network protocols using dynamic on the fly bounded
model checking. We demonstrate the ability of the model
checker, that we have built and incorporated into J-Sim, to
model-check the Ad-Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV)
routing protocol, a fairly complex network protocol with thou-
sands of lines of Java code. Experimental results have shown
that the model checker in J-Sim is able to find counterexamples
of a safety property and witnesses for a liveness property within
acceptable time. Furthermore, protocol-specific properties and
heuristics that are inherent to network protocols expedite the
process of locating these counterexamples and witnesses. Use
of a best-first search strategy (that leverages protocol specific
metrics) also reduces the time and space overheads by several
orders of magnitude.
We believe we have made a case for incorporating model
checking into simulation, so as to provide an integrated perfor-
mance evaluation and validation environment. We have iden-
tified several research avenues for future work. First, we are
currently extending the J-Sim model checker to check general
LTL formulae. We will also enable the model checker to handle
timeout events depend on actual timer values. Second, we will
study whether or not and how the models/classes in J-Sim
can be formally analyzed using JavaFAN (the Java Formal
Analyzer) [40], [41], a recent tool that uses executable semantic
definitions of Java and the JVM written in Maude in order to
symbolically simulate, search the state space of, and model
check Java concurrent programs at both the source-code and
byte-code levels.
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Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0, RTEntry: dst=2 hops=3 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0)
ERROR TRACE
State 1 Depth = 0
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network Empty
State 2 Depth = 1
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:2)
State 3 Depth = 2
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0)
State 4 Depth = 3
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0)
State 5 Depth = 4
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:2)
State 6 Depth = 5
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0)
State 7 Depth = 6
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0)
State 8 Depth = 7
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:0--dest:1)
State 9 Depth = 8
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:2)
State 10 Depth = 9
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREP(src:2--dest:0--seqno:4)
State 11 Depth = 10
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0, RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREP(src:1--dest:0--seqno:4)
State 12 Depth = 11
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0, RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREP(src:1--dest:0--seqno:4)
State 13 Depth = 12
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0, RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREP(src:1--dest:0--seqno:4)
State 14 Depth = 13
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0, RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0)
State 15 Depth = 14
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0, RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREP(src:0--dest:1--seqno:4)
State 16 Depth = 15
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0, RTEntry: dst=2 hops=3 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0)
Total Time = 4.9603651E7 msecs.




Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=1, id=2; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=6 next=1, RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=6; bid=3; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0, RTEntry: dst=2 hops=3 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:2)
ERROR TRACE
State 1 Depth = 0
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network Empty
State 2 Depth = 1
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:2)
State 3 Depth = 2
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREP(src:2--dest:1--seqno:4)
State 4 Depth = 3
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0)
State 5 Depth = 4
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:0--dest:1)
State 6 Depth = 5
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:0--dest:1)
State 7 Depth = 6
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network Empty
State 8 Depth = 7
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network Empty
State 9 Depth = 8
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1; RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:0--dest:1)
State 10 Depth = 9
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREP(src:1--dest:0--seqno:4)
State 11 Depth = 10
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network Empty
State 12 Depth = 11
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network Empty
State 13 Depth = 12
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network Empty
State 14 Depth = 13
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=6; bid=3; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0, RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:2)
State 15 Depth = 14
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=1, id=2; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=6 next=1, RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=6; bid=3; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0, RTEntry: dst=2 hops= ¥ seqno=0 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:2), RREP(src:0--dest:1--seqno:4)
State 16 Depth = 15
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=1, id=2; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=6 next=1, RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=6; bid=3; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0, RTEntry: dst=2 hops=3 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:2)
Total Time = 137.0 msecs.
Fig. 7. Trace of counterexample 3 obtained using Best-first Search 1.
